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Abstract 
Significant developments have recently occurred in the ongoing campaign by the Australian Government 
to combat illegal foreign fishing in Australian waters, particularly against Patagonian toothfish poaching. 
On 22 March 2004 significant amendments to Australia’s fisheries laws were passed by the 
Commonwealth Parliament to improve regulatory efficiency and combat illegal foreign fishing in the 
Australian Fishing Zone (AFZ). In addition, on 12 March 2004 the Federal Court of Australia delivered a 
landmark decision in Olbers v Commonwealth of Australia (No 4) [2004] FCA 229 concerning the 
automatic forfeiture of foreign vessels to the Commonwealth of Australia at the time when a fisheries 
offence occurs rather than upon apprehension. It is argued that the Federal Court’s decision and the 
amendments increase the disparity between measures Australia has adopted within its domestic legal 
regime to deter illegal foreign fishing in the AFZ and its responsibilities under the UN Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (LOSC). 
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Editorial commentary 
DEVELOPMENTS IN AUSTRALIAN FISHERIES LAW: SETTING THE LAW OF 
THE SEA CONVENTION ADRIFT?  
Significant developments have recently occurred in the ongoing campaign by the Australian 
Government to combat illegal foreign fishing in Australian waters, particularly against Patagonian 
toothfish poaching. On 22 March 2004 significant amendments to Australia’s fisheries laws were 
passed by the Commonwealth Parliament to improve regulatory efficiency and combat illegal foreign 
fishing in the Australian Fishing Zone (AFZ).1 In addition, on 12 March 2004 the Federal Court of 
Australia delivered a landmark decision in Olbers v Commonwealth of Australia (No 4) [2004] FCA 
229 concerning the automatic forfeiture of foreign vessels to the Commonwealth of Australia at the 
time when a fisheries offence occurs rather than upon apprehension. It is argued that the Federal 
Court’s decision and the amendments increase the disparity between measures Australia has adopted 
within its domestic legal regime to deter illegal foreign fishing in the AFZ and its responsibilities 
under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC).2 
Fisheries Legislation Amendment (Compliance and Deterrence Measures and 
Other Matters) Act 2004  
The first amendment Act3 is aimed squarely at deterring illegal foreign fishers from operating in the 
AFZ, particularly those who target the prized Patagonian toothfish in the AFZ surrounding Australia’s 
territory of Heard and MacDonald Islands approximately 2,200 nautical miles southwest of Western 
Australia. The amending Act increases the maximum penalty available under the Fisheries 
Management Act 1991 (Cth) (FM Act) for foreign fishing offences committed in the AFZ with 
respect to vessels over 24 metres from $550,000 to $825,000. For vessels of less than 24 metres (such 
as the artisanal vessels often arrested in Australia’s northern waters), the maximum fine remains at 
$550,000. The high prices that can be obtained for Patagonian toothfish and the difficulty of ensuring 
compliance with domestic fisheries laws in remote areas combine to present a significant challenge for 
Australia to deter illegal foreign fishing. In recent years Australia has bolstered its surveillance and 
enforcement capabilities4 and has successfully apprehended a number of foreign vessels in the 
Southern Ocean for alleged illegal fishing in the AFZ, although concern remains that the scale of 
illegal fishing in the region means that many suspected illegal fishing vessels are not apprehended. 
The most recent arrest was of the Uruguayan-flagged Maya V in January 2004. Australia incurs 
significant costs to police these waters, especially for arrests that can only be effected after a “hot 
pursuit”. In two recent cases Australia incurred expenses running into millions of dollars after 
reportedly the longest hot pursuits in history. In 2001 Australia arrested the Togo-flagged South Tomi 
 
1 Australia’s fishing laws are a complex mosaic of Commonwealth, State and Territory laws. A good general reference for 
these laws is Haward M, “The Commonwealth in Australian fisheries management: 1955-1995” (1995) 2 Australasian 
Journal of Natural Resources Law and Policy 313.  The Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Cth) and Fisheries Administration 
Act 1991 (Cth) establish the major Commonwealth fisheries laws, which, as a general rule of thumb (but with many 
exceptions), apply to fisheries outside of the 3 nautical mile limit of State coastal waters and waters around Australia’s external 
territories to the limit of the AFZ. 
2 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3; ATS 1994       
No 31; ILM 21 p 1261 (entered into force for Australia and generally 16 November 1994).  Significantly, the United States has 
yet to ratify LOSC. 
3 Received Royal Assent 1 April 2004; ss 1–3 effective as of 1 April 2004, Sch 1 on Proclamation or after six months. 
4 In November 2003 Australia signed a treaty with France to improve cooperation in surveillance of suspected illegal fishing 
vessels (“Treaty Between the Government of Australia and the Government of the French Republic on Cooperation in the 
Maritime Areas Adjacent to the French Southern and Antarctic Territories (TAAF), Heard Island and the McDonald Islands”).  
In December 2003 the Howard Government announced the allocation of additional funding to police remote fisheries 
including the leasing of an ice-strengthened vessel with a deck-mounted machine gun to patrol areas of the AFZ in which 
Patagonian toothfish are targeted.  See Alexander Downer (Minister for Foreign Affairs) “Maritime agreement sends a strong 
message to illegal fishing operators” (Press release, 24 November 2003) and Ian MacDonald (Minister for Fisheries) 
“Permanent armed patrols to toughen border protection in Southern Ocean” (Press release, 17 December 2003). 
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after a 3,300 nautical mile hot pursuit, and in 2003 Australia arrested the Uruguayan-flagged Viarsa 1 
after a hot pursuit of nearly 4,000 nautical miles.5  
 The amending Act attempts to recoup the expenses incurred in hot pursuits from the owners of 
arrested foreign vessels. The Australian Fisheries Management Authority (AFMA), which administers 
the FM Act, is given the authority to include in any bond amount set for the release of a detained 
foreign vessel the reasonable costs of pursuit and apprehension of the vessel. The amending Act 
defines “pursuit costs” as “costs reasonably incurred by or on behalf of the Commonwealth in respect 
of pursuit activities conducted in respect of the boat”.6 This is further defined to include costs incurred 
by governments of foreign countries that assist in the pursuit or apprehension of the vessel.7 Section 
106L provides that costs will commence from the time the master of a boat fails to stop the boat in 
accordance with a requirement that it do so and, as a result of that failure, pursuit activities are taken. 
The debt stops accruing once the boat is brought to a designated “processing place”8 in Australia 
(likely to be the nearest appropriate Australian port). AFMA is also authorised to develop regulations 
to determine principles for calculating the costs incurred that are directly attributable to the pursuit.9  
A process is provided for contesting the debt in the Federal Court on the grounds that either the vessel 
was not used in an offence against the FM Act or that some or all of the costs were not reasonably 
incurred. The burden of proof is placed on the Commonwealth to establish on the balance of 
probabilities that pursuit costs are reasonable.10  
 The wording of the section to define pursuit costs as those “reasonably” incurred is intended to 
ensure consistency with Australia’s obligation under LOSC to promptly release detained foreign 
vessels upon the posting of a “reasonable bond or other security”.11 In December 2002 Australia 
received a setback to its efforts to increase its deterrence measures for illegal foreign fishing when the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) ruled that Australia had breached its prompt 
release obligation when it set non-financial conditions for the release of the detained Russian fishing 
vessel Volga.12 The amending Act is a bold attempt to further deter illegal foreign fishing and cover 
part of the cost of monitoring, control and surveillance operations by providing a mechanism to 
increase the sums that can be sought from foreign operators in a manner consistent with LOSC. 
However, it is a moot point whether the new section is consistent with LOSC (or rather, whether 
ITLOS would be prepared to consider that it is). The issue of recovering pursuit costs has not been 
tested in any of the prompt release cases heard by ITLOS and it was not an issue considered during 
the drafting process of LOSC. If, for example, Australia seeks to recover pursuit costs from the owner 
of an arrested foreign vessel in the order of A$4 to $5 million, as envisaged by the Minister for 
Fisheries, Senator Ian MacDonald,13 this will undoubtedly be tested in ITLOS. ITLOS has not shown 
itself to be sympathetic to novel interpretations of the bond requirement in LOSC, despite increasing 
 
5 See Molenaar EJ, “Multilateral hot pursuit and illegal fishing in the Southern Ocean: the pursuits of the Viarsa 1 and the 
South Tomi” (2004) 19 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law (forthcoming) and Rothwell DR and Stephens T, 
“Illegal Southern Ocean fishing and prompt release: balancing coastal and flag state rights and interests” (2004) 53 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 155. 
6 Fisheries Legislation Amendment (Compliance and Deterrence Measures and Other Matters) Act 2004, s 106J. 
7 Fisheries Legislation Amendment (Compliance and Deterrence Measures and Other Matters) Act 2004, s 106J.  This is a 
relatively frequent occurrence.  In recent years France, South Africa and the United Kingdom have assisted Australian 
government vessels to arrest foreign fishing boats suspected of illegal fishing activity in the AFZ.  
8 Fisheries Legislation Amendment (Compliance and Deterrence Measures and Other Matters) Act 2004, ss 106J and 
106L(1)(c). 
9 Fisheries Legislation Amendment (Compliance and Deterrence Measures and Other Matters) Act 2004, s 106K. 
10 Fisheries Legislation Amendment (Compliance and Deterrence Measures and Other Matters) Act 2004, s 106S. 
11 LOSC, Art 73(2). 
12 The “Volga” Case (Russian Federation v Australia) (Prompt Release) (Judgment) (2002) ITLOS Case No 11.  The       
non-financial conditions set included the requirements that information be provided about the beneficial owners of the vessel 
and that the vessel carry a vessel monitoring system.  See Gullett W, “Prompt release procedures and the challenge for fisheries 
law enforcement: the judgment of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in the Volga Case (Russian Federation v 
Australia)” (2003) 31 FLR 395. 
13 Parliament of Australia Senate Hansard, 10 February 2004, 19609. 
 Editorial commentary 
(2004) 21 EPLJ 169 171 ©  
awareness in the fisheries policy community that more rigorous measures are needed to combat the 
growing problem of illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing.14 As such, it remains to be seen 
whether ITLOS will allow pursuit costs to fall within the definition of “reasonable bond” in LOSC, 
and if so, whether the manner in which Australia calculates pursuits costs is also “reasonable”. ITLOS 
would certainly strike down sums that are excessive, not proportionate to the offence or designed 
simply to prevent the vessel from ever being released.15  
 Aside from doubt about the legality of this provision under present international law, there are 
practical limitations in enforcing the payment of such debts against owners of foreign vessels. When 
vessels are arrested, it is their senior crew (and unusually in the case of the Maya V, the entire crew),16 
who are charged with fisheries offences under domestic law. However, the measures that can be 
adopted to deter foreign boat owners from engaging in illegal foreign fishing is effectively limited to 
depriving them of the use of their vessels. The bond that can now be set is likely in many cases to 
greatly exceed the value of detained vessels. In these circumstances, foreign boat owners will probably 
simply abandon their vessels and their crew. They would only contemplate paying such a bond if it 
were less than the cost associated with lost fishing time and purchasing, equipping and recrewing a 
new vessel.  
 The amending Act also expands AFMA’s ability to use its directional power as the principal tool 
to introduce new fisheries management measures for fisheries for which a Plan of Management 
currently does not exist. The current method for introducing management measures for such fisheries 
is a cumbersome indirect process of licence or permit condition variation. The ability to issue 
directions for particular fisheries enables management measures to be introduced quickly when 
exigencies arise. A concern for the fishing industry is that no consequential amendment has been made 
to s 165 of the FM Act to allow recourse to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) for fishing 
concession holders aggrieved by the effects of direction notices. The majority of AFMA decisions 
under the FM Act are reviewable by the AAT and in fact AFMA regularly faces challenges to its 
decisions in the AAT.17 The significance of the amendment is that it extends the directional power to 
all fisheries – most of which do not currently have a Plan of Management in place. As such, the ability 
for fishers to seek merits review of new regulations which affect their fishing operations (such as area 
conditions or closing or partially closing a fishery) has been reduced significantly. Although direction 
notices are disallowable instruments and they must pass through parliamentary scrutiny, to date no 
fisheries direction notices have been disallowed by parliament. 
Fisheries Legislation Amendment (High Seas Fishing Activities and Other 
Matters) Act 2004 
The second amending Act18 provides the necessary amendments to the FM Act and the Fisheries 
Administration Act 1991 (Cth) (FA Act) to enable Australia finally to formally accept the 1993 
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization’s Agreement to Promote Compliance with 
International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas (the 
“Compliance Agreement”).19 In 2003 the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties20 recommended that 
 
14 See, for example, Bray K, “Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing” in Nordquist MH and Moore JN (eds), 
Current fisheries issues and the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (Kluwer Law International, 2000) 
115. 
15 See The “Monte Confurco” Case (Seychelles v France) (Prompt Release) (Judgment) (2000) ITLOS Case No 6, para 73.  
In this case, ITLOS reduced the bond amount set by France for the release of the Seychelles-flagged vessel by more than two 
thirds. 
16 AFMA, “Entire crew of Maya V charged with illegal fishing” (Press release, 12 February 2004).  
17 See, for example, Gullett W, Paterson C and Fisher E, “Substantive precautionary decision-making: the Australian Fisheries 
Management Authority’s ‘lawful pursuit’ of the precautionary principle” (2001) 7 Australasian Journal of Natural Resources 
Law and Policy 95. 
18 Received Royal Assent 2 April 2004; ss 1-3 effective as of 2 April 2004; Schs 1 and 2 on Proclamation but not before the 
Compliance Agreement enters into force for Australia, or after six months. 
19 Entered into force 24 April 2003. 
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Australia accept the Compliance Agreement and the government has indicated that it will sign the 
Agreement now that the Act has passed through Parliament.21 The amending Act gives effect to 
obligations under the Compliance Agreement, principally in relation to licensing and supervision of 
Australian-flagged vessels for high seas fishing and the requirement that a register is maintained of 
vessels authorised to fish on the high seas. The Compliance Agreement aims to curtail the practice of 
reflagging vessels that have had their fishing permits cancelled or suspended in their original country 
for noncompliance with international fisheries conservation measures. Reflagging enables fishing 
operators to avoid the consequences of fishing permit cancellation by seeking new fishing permits in 
another country. This is typically undertaken in “flag of convenience” countries (perhaps better 
termed “flag of noncompliance” countries)22 which either do not cooperate with international 
conservation measures or are unable to control the high seas fishing activities of their vessels. The 
amending Act provides that AFMA is precluded from licensing such vessels subject to two exceptions 
contained in the Compliance Agreement.23 First, AFMA can grant a person a high seas fishing 
concession with respect to an Australian-flagged vessel that had previously received a suspension or 
cancellation of fishing authority in another country if the person satisfies AFMA that the owner or 
operator of the vessel that received the suspension or cancellation no longer has control of the vessel 
or a legal or financial interest in it. Second, AFMA can grant a fishing concession if it is satisfied that 
the grant “will not be likely to undermine international conservation and management measures”.24 
Just as in the case of the previous amending Act, no consequential amendment is made to s 165 of the 
FM Act. As such, appeal to the AAT is unavailable for decisions made under the new provisions.      
A person who, for example, has sought and been denied a high seas fishing concession due to an 
allegation that the vessel had previously had its authorisation for high seas fishing from another 
country suspended will be unable to seek merits review of the decision. However, the lack of recourse 
to the AAT is unlikely to be a problem in practice because Australia is not a flag of convenience 
country and it is thus unlikely that operators of such vessels will choose to register them in Australia.  
 The second amending Act also provides various miscellaneous amendments aimed at improving 
the operating efficiency of AFMA. Most notable is the increase of powers of officers under the FM 
Act (including members of the Federal Police, Customs and Defence) to stop and detain vehicles and 
aircraft in certain circumstances without the consent of the owner or a warrant.25 Senator Ian 
MacDonald justified this broadening of powers on the increasing use of output controls to manage 
fisheries resources. The principal output control used – fishing quotas – requires monitoring of the 
unloading of fish from vessels and the transportation of catch. The power would thus apply where an 
officer believes a vehicle may be carrying fish landed in contravention of the FM Act or without 
proper documentation in a location or in circumstances where a delay in obtaining the warrant would 
frustrate its execution. Nevertheless, the Minister stated that the power “will be used only in very 
limited circumstances”,26 in part because of the ability in many circumstances to obtain warrants 
quickly by electronic means. 
 Another important aspect of the second amending Act is the reclassification of “charter fishing” 
from commercial to recreational fishing to enable it to be managed generally at the State level rather 
than at the federal level. This amendment was prompted by the conclusion in the 2003 Review of 
Commonwealth Fisheries Policy that the Commonwealth arrange for the day-to-day management of 
 
20 Parliament of Australia, Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Agreement to Promote Compliance with International 
Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas, done at Rome on 24 November 1993: 
National Interest Analysis. 
21 Parliament of Australia Senate Hansard, 11 February 2004, 19893. 
22 Molenaar EJ, “Participation, allocation and unregulated fishing: the practice of regional fisheries management 
organisations” (2003) 18 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 457 at 461. 
23 Compliance Agreement, Art III(5)(c)(d). 
24 Fisheries Legislation Amendment (High Seas Fishing Activities and Other Matters) Act 2004, s 16B(5). 
25 Fisheries Legislation Amendment (High Seas Fishing Activities and Other Matters) Act 2004, s 84(1AB). 
26 Parliament of Australia Senate Hansard, 11 February 2004, 19901. 
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charter fisheries to be undertaken by the States and the Northern Territory.27 Two matters of concern 
are that there is no requirement for charter boat operators to provide catch data to AFMA and a 
number of States do not presently have laws regulating charter fishing.28 Charter fishing has emerged 
as another area in fisheries management that shows that the Offshore Constitutional Settlement (1979-
1980) (OCS) has not provided the final resolution to all fisheries jurisdiction issues. Another area of 
difficulty is the Commonwealth’s authority to manage some targeted species (such as gummy and 
school shark) to the high water mark. This overlaps with State jurisdiction, most notably within areas 
proclaimed under State law as marine protected areas in which commercial fishing is prohibited. The 
three nautical mile limit of State jurisdiction granted by the OCS continues to present a challenge to 
drafters of marine resource management legislation.  
Olbers v Commonwealth of Australia (No 4) [2004] FCA 229 
Olbers v Commonwealth of Australia (No 4) [2004] FCA 229 is the latest in a series of court cases 
concerning Australia’s arrest of the Russian vessel Volga in the area adjacent to the AFZ surrounding 
Heard and MacDonald Islands on 7 February 2002 for alleged illegal fishing within the AFZ. Previous 
cases included applications by members of its crew charged with fisheries offences to vary bail 
conditions29 and an unsuccessful application by Olbers, the Russian company which owned the Volga, 
for a stay of civil proceedings pending completion of criminal proceedings against the crew.30 In the 
present case, Olbers sought a declaration that Australia’s seizure and detention of the vessel was 
unlawful and an order for the vessel and its equipment to be returned. Specifically, it was submitted by 
Olbers that the pursuit and seizure of the vessel was not conducted in a manner consistent with either 
the FM Act or LOSC. 
 The case centred on the operation of s 106A of the FM Act which provides for the automatic 
forfeiture to the Commonwealth of foreign vessels used in various fisheries offences within the AFZ. 
Section 106 of the FM Act provides for forfeiture of a vessel following a court order. Section 106A 
was introduced to the FM Act by the Fisheries Legislation Amendment Act (No 1) 1999. Prior to its 
enactment there was no provision for automatic forfeiture in the FM Act.  
 The alleged offences concerned ss 100 (using a foreign boat for fishing in the AFZ – strict 
liability offence) and 101 (having foreign boat equipped with nets, etc – strict liability offence) of the 
FM Act. The Volga had not been issued with an Australian foreign fishing licence or port permit and 
Olbers did not argue that the vessel had been passing innocently through the AFZ. French J found that 
the Volga had engaged in unlawful fishing in the AFZ between 12-20 January 2002 even though 
Australian authorities had not seen the vessel fishing in the AFZ. His determination was based on the 
presence of fresh Patagonian toothfish onboard the vessel at the time of its arrest slightly outside the 
AFZ on 7 February 2002, navigation tracks recovered from the vessel’s computer and evidence that 
not all fishing gear had been stowed. French J found that the proper interpretation of s 106A, aided by 
the title of the subdivision under which it is located (“Automatic forfeiture of things used in 
offences”), was that it operates to transfer title from the owner of a foreign vessel to the 
Commonwealth at the time it is used in a relevant fisheries offence. French J found that title to the 
Volga transferred from Olbers to the Commonwealth in January 2002, when the vessel was used for 
commercial fishing within the AFZ in breach of ss 100 and 101 of the FM Act, although the vessel 
was not apprehended until 7 February 2002.31  
 The effect of the decision was that Olbers had no legal right to challenge the manner in which the 
Volga was pursued or seized. This was because Olbers had ceased being its owner by the time the 
 
27 Commonwealth Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, Looking to the future: a review of Commonwealth 
fisheries policy (June 2003) p 27. 
28 Parliament of Australia Senate Hansard, 11 February 2004, 19896-19897, 19988-19989. 
29 Lijo v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) [2003] WASCA 4 (Unreported, Anderson, Templeman JJ and Olsson AUJ, 16 
December 2002). 
30 Olbers v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) [2003] FCA 177 (decision 11 March 2003). 
31 Olbers v Commonwealth of Australia (No 4) [2004] FCA 229 at [62], [63] and [80]. 
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pursuit was commenced on 7 February 2002. By operation of Australian law, the vessel had become 
an Australian vessel and thus Australia had simply seized its own vessel.  
 After rejecting submissions that s 106A was unconstitutional on the basis that it provides for 
forfeiture of property in the absence of judicial determination of the commission of an offence or that 
it amounts to compulsory acquisition of property other than on just terms, French J noted that it: 
creates a real risk for any fishing vessel owner whose boat enters the AFZ. The risk to the owner is 
that, even if not apprehended at the time of any illegal fishing … or presence … in the AFZ, the boat 
will leave the AFZ, with an insecure title. While apprehension may not be immediate … the 
Commonwealth may be in a position to assert that, under Australian law, it has become the legal owner 
of the boat. Escape to the high seas will not shed that status under Australian law or in any jurisdiction 
in which Australian title will be recognised.32  
 The Federal Court decision delighted Senator Macdonald who immediately issued a press release 
stating that the decision “supports the Government’s view that if a foreign fishing is sighted illegally 
fishing in Australian waters then that vessel, its equipment and catch is automatically forfeited to the 
Commonwealth and becomes the property of the Commonwealth”.33 He stated further that he will be:  
seeking further legal advice on whether a number of other foreign fishing vessels sighted in the AFZ 
over recent years, but not apprehended, might be able to be seized anywhere on the globe on the basis 
that they are now actually Australian property having been automatically forfeited to Australia on the 
actual date of the fishing in the AFZ.34  
 Although the Federal Court has upheld the validity of s 106A under Australian law, its validity 
under international law is an entirely different matter. The Federal Court decision means, for example, 
that any foreign vessel which otherwise is merely exercising rights or freedoms of navigation through 
Australia’s maritime zones would automatically become owned by the Commonwealth as soon as it 
enters the AFZ if, for example, it had onboard commercial fishing nets, traps or equipment that were 
not stowed or secured,35 or at a time when a member of its crew engages in recreational fishing from 
the vessel in the AFZ.36 This would be the case irrespective of whether Australia attempted to effect 
an arrest of the vessel or even detected the commission of an offence, although, in practice, the 
forfeiture provision cannot be enforced unless the vessel has been seized. Further, a vessel can only be 
seized if there are reasonable grounds to believe that it has been used in a fisheries offence,37 and it is 
likely to be more difficult to gain evidence of the offence to the relevant standard of proof after the 
event and it is also unlikely that Australia would seek to apply the automatic forfeiture provision with 
respect to technical or minor infringements of the FM Act. Nevertheless, where a foreign vessel has 
been lawfully seized by Australia any remedies or rights held by its owners under LOSC (such as, for 
example, with respect to its release upon the posting of a reasonable bond or other security38 or 
payment of compensation for any loss or damage sustained during its arrest in circumstances which do 
not justify the exercise of the right of hot pursuit)39 are now apparently unavailable if they do not 
successfully contest a purported forfeiture of their vessel.40 It would thus be imperative for             
pre-forfeiture owners of such vessels to use the forfeiture contest procedure to establish on the balance 
of probabilities that a relevant fisheries offence had not occurred. It is to be noted that the defence of 
mistake of fact is available for the relevant fisheries offences.41 However, even if it were established 
 
32 Olbers v Commonwealth of Australia (No 4) [2004] FCA 229 at [77]. 
33 Ian MacDonald (Minister for Fisheries) “New chapter in maritime law: attempt to claim back the Volga rejected” (Press 
release, 13 March 2004). 
34 MacDonald, n 33. 
35 Fisheries Management Act 1991, s 101(1)(d). 
36 Fisheries Management Act 1991, s 99. 
37 Fisheries Management Act 1991, s 84(1)(g)(ii). 
38 LOSC, Art 73(2). 
39 LOSC, Art 111(8). 
40 Fisheries Management Act 1991, ss 106B – 106G.  
41 The offences in the FM Act are subject to Chapter 2 of the Criminal Code (s 6A FM Act). They are stated to be offences of 
strict liability (s 6.1 of the Code).  Therefore, the Commonwealth does not need to prove a fault element of intention, 
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that a fisheries offence had occurred (thus operating to forfeit the vessel), a significant disparity would 
exist between the operation of Australian law and LOSC. It is unlikely that ITLOS would allow LOSC 
to be interpreted in a manner that would allow Australian domestic law to operate in a way that runs 
counter to the balance struck in LOSC between the rights of coastal states and the rights of fishing 
nations and have the effect of rendering some LOSC provisions inoperable.  
 Although it was unnecessary for French J to determine whether the arrest of the Volga was 
conducted in a manner consistent with the FM Act or LOSC, his Honour made a significant comment 
by way of obiter dicta concerning the operation of the pursuit provisions in the FM Act. He noted the 
apparent incompatibility of s 87 of the FM Act with the hot pursuit provisions in LOSC.42 Art 111 of 
the LOSC provides, among other things, that pursuit of a vessel to the high seas may only be 
continued “if the pursuit has not been interrupted”.43 Although s 87 of the FM Act also provides that a 
pursuit may only be continued if “the pursuit was not terminated or interrupted”, this is further 
qualified such that pursuit is not to be taken as having been terminated or interrupted only because the 
pursuing officer loses sight of the boat44 or loses “output from a radar or other sensing device”.45 
LOSC does not provide such a qualification and not only is there reason to doubt that such a 
qualification could be read into Art 111, it would also seem that it is inconsistent with customary 
international law requirements concerning hot pursuit.46 French J noted, but did not conclude, that the 
interpretation of s 87 “must have regard to the practical exigencies of the circumstances in which 
pursuit might have to be undertaken”.47 While this proposition may be supportable in terms of the 
legal requirements for a hot pursuit under Australian law, it has not been specifically tested in ITLOS 
with respect to the interpretation of LOSC. 
 An ironic and possibly unforeseen effect of the Federal Court’s decision is that it casts doubt on 
the ability of Australia to enforce payments for pursuit costs from owners of foreign vessels provided 
in the new Fisheries Legislation Amendment (Compliance and Deterrence Measures and Other 
Matters) Act 2004. The new s 106L(2) provides that pursuit costs incurred by Australia are a debt 
payable by the “owner of a foreign boat” to the Commonwealth. Following the Olbers case, by 
definition pursuit costs can only commence from the time a stop order is issued and only accrue with 
respect to vessels that have been used in relevant fisheries offences. As such, pursuit costs can only be 
accrued when the Commonwealth owns the vessel and thus the Commonwealth would be liable to pay 
itself any pursuit costs incurred.  
 The new process for recovering pursuit costs from owners of foreign fishing vessels and the 
Federal Court’s decision to uphold the validity of a domestic law provision which operates to 
automatically forfeit foreign vessels used in fisheries offences in the AFZ to the Commonwealth show 
that Australian fisheries law is drifting further away from provisions in LOSC which protect various 
rights of foreign owners of such vessels. However, Australia remains bound to its obligations under 
LOSC (a matter that concerns both domestic legislation and judicial rulings). This is because 
Australia’s sovereign rights in the areas of the AFZ that overlap with the Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ) (between 12 nautical miles and a maximum of 200 nautical miles from the baseline) are those 
derived from LOSC itself and Australia’s ability to take enforcement action in the EEZ against foreign 
vessels are limited to measures that conform with LOSC.48 This divide between Australian and 
international fisheries law is only likely to be narrowed if ITLOS declares valid an exercise by 
 
knowledge, recklessness or negligence (ss 5.1-5.6 of the Code), but the defence of mistake of fact (s 9.2 of the Code) is 
available.  To establish a mistake of fact a person must prove on the balance of probabilities that the person considered 
whether or not facts existed, and was under a mistaken but reasonable belief about those facts. 
42 Olbers v Commonwealth of Australia (No 4) [2004] FCA 229 at [97]. 
43 LOSC, Art 111(1). 
44 Fisheries Management Act 1991, s 87(2). 
45 Fisheries Management Act 1991, s 87(3). 
46 See I’m Alone (Canada v USA) (1935) 3 UN RIAA 1609 and Barrett W, “Illegal fishing in zones subject to national 
jurisdiction” (1998) 5 James Cook University LR 1 at 18. 
47 Olbers v Commonwealth of Australia (No 4) [2004] FCA 229 at [96]. 
48 See LOSC, Art 62(4) and Art 73(1). 
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Australia of the recovery of pursuits costs provision or the automatic forfeiture provision. However, 
this is unlikely – especially with regard to the automatic forfeiture provision. Australia could reduce 
the prospect of a challenge before ITLOS of a purported forfeiture of a foreign vessel if it chooses to 
rely on s 106 of the FM Act because it has less potential to be inconsistent with LOSC than the 
(perhaps unnecessary) s 106A. This would also mean that owners of foreign vessels would have the 
same legal rights under Australian law to challenge forfeiture as owners of seized Australian vessels. 
 It is understandable that Australia is seeking innovative ways to increase measures to deter illegal 
foreign fishing to provide for more effective management and protection of its fisheries. The 
management responsibilities given to coastal states in LOSC are insufficiently detailed to address the 
array of issues associated with the growing problem of IUU fishing and it is logical for Australia to 
develop state practice in the interpretation of the provisions in LOSC in light of the challenges 
presented by IUU fishing and strengthening international resolve to eliminate it. However, the 
measures that can be adopted remain constrained by various provisions of LOSC intended to 
safeguard rights of owners of foreign vessels. The restrictive text of LOSC (which was drafted long 
before the emergence of large scale IUU fishing) and ITLOS’s tendency to interpret its provisions in a 
legalistic manner,49 continue to present a significant challenge to coastal states seeking ways to 
combat the problem of illegal foreign fishing, especially in remote areas of their EEZs. 
Warwick Gullett* 
LLB, BA (Hons) (Monash), PhD (ANU) 
Centre for Maritime Policy 
Lecturer 
Faculty of Law 
University of Wollongong 
 
HOW DO YOU LIKE THEM APPLES?: THE WTO AND QUARANTINE 
RESTRICTIONS 
In November 2003, the WTO Appellate Body (AB) ruled that Japan’s apple import restrictions to 
prevent the spread of fire-blight were inconsistent with the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary Measures (SPSA).1 The decision in Japan-Apples confirms the SPSA’s strong 
focus on science as the basis for national plant protection and quarantine measures, and raises new 
questions about the trade regime’s willingness to permit precautionary approaches to quarantine. It is 
a portent for Australia’s strict quarantine regime which the WTO will scrutinise later this year in a 
complaint brought by the EU. 
Japan’s fire-blight measures 
Since 1994, Japan has maintained strict controls on the importation of apple fruit from the United 
States, on the stated basis of preventing the spread of fire-blight or its disease-causing organism, 
Erwinia amylovora (e.amylovora). Fire-blight affects apples, pears, quince and loquat, and has spread 
widely across North and South America, Europe and elsewhere. To date, Japan has been fire-blight 
free.2 
 
49 Gullett, n 12, at 407. 
* I thank Chris McGrath, Erik Molenaar and Joanna Vince for comments on previous versions of this commentary. Any errors 
or omissions remain my own. 
1 Japan – Measures affecting the importation of apples, Appellate Body Report, WT/DS245/AB/R, 15 July 2003 (Japan-
Apples, AB). 
2 Japan – Measures affecting the importation of apples, Panel Report, WT/DS245/R, 26 November 2003, ¶2.6 (Japan-Apples, 
Panel). 
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 The bulk of scientific evidence indicates that mature healthy apples cannot carry e.amylovora, but 
that immature or infected apples can. Imports of mature, symptomless fruit do not, on current 
evidence, pose a likelihood of fire-blight entry. But Japan’s restrictions went much further than simply 
limiting imports to these products. The disputed measures, deriving from a series of laws, regulations 
and policies,3 required: 
• importation only from designated fire-blight free orchards that were free of any infected fruit or 
any other plant that hosts e.amolyvora, and which were protected by a 500 metre buffer zone; 
• that the orchard and buffer zone be inspected three times per year, at critical points on the fruiting 
and harvesting cycle, with additional inspections after strong storms;  
• that the harvest inspection be conducted jointly by US and Japanese inspectors;  
• that apples be soaked in a surface disinfectant solution and the containers for packing and 
shipments be treated with a chlorine solution; and 
• that apples destined for Japan be kept separate from other harvested fruit, and be certified as 
disease-free by US officials, with this certification confirmed by Japanese inspectors.4 
 These measures limited imports to fruit from selected orchards in Washington and Oregon States. 
Japan argued that its measures guarded against an as yet undetermined risk of mature, symptomless 
apples developing and spreading fire-blight and from the accidental introduction of infected or 
infested apples within a shipment of healthy apples.5 
The SPSA’s rules on phytosanitary measures 
The SPSA was introduced in 1995 as part of the suite of WTO Agreements establishing a rules-based 
framework for the liberalisation of trade in goods. It aims to control the use of food safety, plant 
protection and animal health requirements as new non-tariff barriers to trade. It permits WTO 
Members to observe high quarantine and food, plant and animal safety standards, but imposes 
disciplines on how those standards are to be developed and implemented. The SPSA reveals an 
overall preference for the adoption of international standards, with a view to harmonising standards 
over time. The Agreement preserves Members’ rights to develop their own measures where no 
international standard exists, or where the international standard is insufficient to achieve the level of 
protection sought by the Member. In such cases, the measures must comply with a range of 
obligations. In the Japan-Apples dispute, the obligations in question required that Japan base its 
measure on sufficient scientific evidence (Art 2.2) and undertake a risk assessment (Art 5.1). Japan 
argued that it had complied with these requirements. It argued in the alternative that the restrictions 
were a provisional measure, which the SPSA permits where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, 
provided additional evidence is obtained within a reasonable period (Art 5.7). 
Sufficiency of scientific evidence 
Earlier SPSA disputes have established that a trade-restrictive food safety, plant or animal health 
measure is based upon sufficient scientific evidence if there is a “rational or objective relationship” 
between the measure and the evidence.6 This is to be determined on a case-by-case basis, and depends 
on such factors as the characteristics of the measure in question and the quality and quantity of the 
scientific evidence.7 In Japan-Apples, the WTO Panel determining the US complaint examined the 
scientific evidence adduced by the parties and three fire-blight experts. It concluded that: 
 
3 The measures derived from the Plant Protection Law (Law No. 151; enacted 4 May 1950), as amended; the Plant Protection 
Regulations (Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries Ordinance No. 73, enacted 30 June 1950), as amended; Ministry 
of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Notification No. 354 (dated 10 March 1997); detailed rules and regulations, including 
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries Circular 8103. (Japan-Apples, Panel, n 2, para. 8.7) 
4 Japan-Apples, AB, n 1, para 15. 
5 Japan-Apples, Panel, n 2, para 8.28(b). 
6 Japan – Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, Appellate Body Report, WT/DS76/AB/R, adopted 19 March 1999, paras  
73–74, 82, and 84. 
7 Japan – Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, n 6, para 84. 
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• the scientific evidence indicated that mature apples are unlikely to harbour e.amylovora if they 
show no symptoms of infection;  
• the scientific evidence did not support the conclusion that infected or infested crates could serve 
as a vector for fire-blight; and  
• even if infected or infested apples were exported to Japan and populations of bacteria survived, 
the risks of spread to host plants could only occur “through an additional sequence of events that 
is deemed unlikely, and that has not been experimentally established to date”.8 
 Based on these findings, the Panel concluded that the risk of transmission via apple fruit was 
negligible, and that available scientific evidence did not indicate that apples were a likely pathway for 
the entry, establishment or spread of fire-blight in Japan.9 It then compared this evidence of risk with 
the elements of the Japanese regime for fire-blight prevention, and concluded that the measures were 
disproportionate to the evidence of risk, and thus lacked a rational or objective relationship.10 
 Japan argued that the Panel should have accorded it a “certain degree of discretion” in the way it 
chose, weighed, and evaluated scientific evidence.11 The AB rejected this contention on the basis that 
according deference to the respondent’s own findings would prevent a Panel from making an 
objective assessment of the facts, as required by Art 11 of the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding.12 Accordingly, the AB upheld the Panel’s finding that Japan’s measures were not 
based on sufficient scientific evidence.13 
Not a provisional measure 
Japan relied, in the alternative, on Art 5.7 of the SPSA, which permits Members to introduce 
provisional measures where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient. It is the only “exception” to the 
Art 2.2 requirement that measures be based on sufficient scientific evidence, and is seen by many as 
the SPSA’s principal articulation of the precautionary principle. The language of Art 5.7 requires that: 
(a) the measure is imposed where “relevant scientific evidence is insufficient”;  
(b) the measure is adopted “on the basis of available pertinent information”; 
(c) the Member “seek[s] to obtain the additional information necessary for a more objective 
assessment of risk”; and 
(d) that Member “review[s] the … measure accordingly within a reasonable period of time”.14 
 All four requirements must be satisfied in order to rely on Art 5.7. The first two set conditions for 
introducing a measure. The third and fourth requirements highlight the provisional nature of the 
exception, by limiting the maintenance of measures to the “reasonable period” during which additional 
information is sought in order to make a more objective assessment of risk. 
 Japan failed the first requirement of Art 5.7. The AB agreed with the Panel’s conclusion that 
Japan’s restriction on apple imports was not a situation where “relevant scientific evidence was 
insufficient” to permit the evaluation of the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of fire-blight 
in Japan.15 The Panel found that there was a large quantity of high quality scientific evidence on the 
risk of transmission of fire-blight through apple fruit. The experts expressed strong confidence in the 
reliability of this evidence16 and Japan provided no evidence to refute its credibility or 
 
8 Japan-Apples Panel, n 2, paras 8.168 and 8.171. 
9 Japan-Apples Panel, n 2, paras 8.169, 8.176. 
10 Japan-Apples Panel, n 2, paras 8.198-8.199. 
11 Japan-Apples AB, n 1, para 163, citing Japan's appellant submission, paras 75-76. 
12 Applying EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, Appellate Body Report, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, 
¶117. 
13 Japan-Apples AB,  n 1, para 168. 
14 Japan – Agricultural Products, above n 6, para 89. 
15 Japan-Apples AB, n 1, para 179 
16 Japan-Apples Panel, n 2, paras 8.216–8.219. 
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persuasiveness.17  The AB upheld the Panel’s conclusion that there was in fact sufficient science upon 
which to conduct a risk assessment and to conclude that the risk was negligible.18  
 The AB also rejected Japan’s claim that the Panel had taken an unnecessarily restrictive approach 
to the scope of Art 5.7. The Panel had said that Art 5.7 is intended to address only “situations where 
little, or no, reliable evidence was available on the subject matter at issue”.19 Japan argued that this 
approach emphasised new risks that create new uncertainty, but did not encompass situations of on-
going or “unresolved uncertainty” where accumulated evidence fails to provide conclusive proof.20 
The AB rejected this criticism, emphasising that Art 5.7 is triggered by the insufficiency of scientific 
evidence upon which to base a risk assessment, not by scientific uncertainty.21 It noted that the two 
concepts were not interchangeable, but went no further in elaborating the difference between them. It 
said that Art 5.7 is broad enough to be invoked where there is a substantial quantity of evidence, if its 
quality is unreliable, thus covering the scenario posited by Japan.22 
No risk assessment 
Japan also failed to comply with the requirement that its measures be based on a risk assessment. The 
risk assessment obligation in Art 5.1 amplifies and implements the requirement that SPS measures not 
be maintained without sufficient scientific evidence. The 1999 document that Japan relied on as its 
risk assessment was ruled to be deficient because it failed to address the specific risk arising from 
apple imports, rather than the general risks of fruit-borne fire-blight.23 Moreover, it had only assessed 
the possibility, not the probability, of entry or spread of e.amylovora, as the SPSA requires.24 Finally, 
it failed to evaluate the risk by reference to the effectiveness of mitigating measures that might be 
applied.25 The 1999 assessment attempted to justify the maintenance each of the measures already in 
place, rather than to evaluate the need for all measures cumulatively.26 
Implications of the decision for precautionary policies 
Never has the adage that “bad facts make bad law” been truer than in relation to WTO disputes under 
the SPSA. In all of the disputes heard to date (the European ban on growth hormone beef, Australia’s 
ban on fresh Canadian salmon, Japan’s varietals testing policy for fruit imports), the measures 
complained of had at least some element that rendered their bona fides questionable. It is therefore 
unsurprising that every complaint has succeeded. In Japan-Apples, the Panel was probably justified in 
concluding that the risks of fire-blight spreading from apple imports was negligible. This conclusion 
may have been strengthened by an awareness of Japan’s practice of using SPS measures as a means of 
protecting local horticulturalists from international competition.  
 The weak basis for many disputed measures has contributed to a narrow reading of SPSA 
provisions. Since no Member has successfully defended an SPS complaint to date, neither Panels nor 
the AB have been able to highlight those parts of the SPSA that preserve national SPS autonomy. 
Japan-Apples fleshes out this existing SPSA jurisprudence, and highlights the power of WTO panels 
to substitute their own judgments on science for those of the responding Member. The Panel’s reliance 
on the evidence of experts in this dispute suggests that Members wishing to introduce or maintain SPS 
measures must engage with international scientific opinion, and not rely upon a limited range of 
views. No deference will be given to the choices of methodology or emphasis made by national 
governments. The Panel’s assessment is essentially a de novo review of the need for an SPS measure, 
albeit with the complaining party bearing the onus of proof. The AB makes clear that the sufficiency 
 
17 Japan-Apples Panel, n 2, para 7.9. 
18 Japan-Apples AB, n 1, para182. 
19 Japan-Apples Panel, n 2, para 8.219. 
20 Japan-Apples AB, n 1, para 180. 
21 Japan-Apples AB, n 1, para 184. 
22 Japan-Apples AB, n 1, para 185. 
23 Japan-Apples AB, n 1, paras 203-206. 
24 Japan-Apples AB, n 1, para ¶191, citing Japan-Apples Panel, n 2, para 8.271. 
25 Japan-Apples AB, n 1, paras 193, 209. 
26 Japan-Apples AB, n 1, para 209. 
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of scientific evidence is a case-by-case determination. It recognises that a large volume of evidence 
may nonetheless be insufficient if it lacks rigour or credibility, or presumably, if its conclusions point 
in different directions. Until a panel and the AB actually uphold a SPS measure as having a sufficient 
scientific basis, the scope of these “leeways” remain unclear. 
 Perhaps the most concerning aspect of the dispute for advocates of a precautionary approach to 
SPS risks is the AB’s attitude towards Art 5.7, dealing with provisional measures. This is the second 
dispute in which Japan has failed to make a case under Art 5.7. In the first, Japan-Agricultural 
Products, the Panel was not satisfied that Japan had attempted to gather additional evidence within a 
reasonable period of time.27 The Japan-Apples AB considered the threshold requirement that there be 
insufficient scientific evidence upon which to formulate a concluded position. It is frustrating that the 
AB distinguished scientific “insufficiency” from scientific “uncertainty” with no further exploration of 
this distinction. One can imagine cases where there may exist sufficient scientific evidence upon 
which to arrive at opposing conclusions, depending upon which data one prefers. “Sufficiency” may 
require  less than “certainty”. A focus away from uncertainty could therefore limit Art 5.7’s 
precautionary potential, and thereby prioritise the SPSA’s trade facilitation role over the reservation of 
national regulatory choices. 
 Finally, Japan-Apples is another example of how demanding the SPSA’s risk assessment 
requirements are. Australia failed this requirement in Canada’s complaint against Australia’s 
restrictions on fresh salmon imports.28 The need to assess the probability (rather than possibility) of 
entry, spread or establishment, and to evaluate this risk by reference to the full range of possible SPS 
measures that could be employed is extremely demanding. A reading of Japan-Apples suggests that 
Japan fell well short of these requirements, so it is hard to predict just how exacting they will be in 
future cases. It is not surprising, though, that the two highly publicised Biosecurity Australia import 
risk analyses recently released for public comment both recommend a relaxation of Australia’s import 
restrictions on apples (in relation to fire-blight risks) and bananas (in relation to a range of pests and 
diseases).29 The restriction on bananas is already the subject of a complaint against Australia brought 
by the Philippines, and the removal of restrictions is currently the subject of a Senate inquiry. 
Similarly, Australia’s position on fire-blight and apples has been a long-term source of trade tension 
with New Zealand. No doubt New Zealand will view the Japan-Apples decision as vindication of its 
insistence upon the safety of its products.  
 Despite these concerns, there is one aspect of the AB decision that should be welcomed by 
Members seeking to impose broad-ranging SPS measures. The United States had argued that Japan’s 
restrictions should be examined for their effect on US exports of mature, symptomless apples on the 
basis that this was what the United States exported. This would have made Japan’s measures even 
harder to justify. Japan, on the other hand, argued that a key aspect of its fire-blight prevention 
strategy was to avoid the inadvertent importation of immature, diseased fruit, caused by human or 
technical errors or illegal actions.30 The AB ruled that Japan was not limited to the facts and 
arguments claimed in the US complaint in responding to that complaint, provided its response was 
relevant to the dispute.31 This ruling makes it easier to justify measures aimed at preventing the risk of 
system failures or illegal actions, that are broader than necessary to address the risk of importing 
healthy or “uncontaminated” products. 
Jan McDonald 
Law School 
Griffith University 
 
27 Japan-Agricultural Products, n 6. 
28 Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, Appellate Body Report, WT/DS18/AB/R. 
29 The Bananas IRA may require further revision, however, because scrutiny of the data during the public comment period 
revealed an error in the conversion of data in an excel spreadsheet which could have resulted in an underestimating of the 
potential risks. AFFA, Plant Biosecurity Policy Memorandum 2004/7, Addendum to Revised Draft IRA Report – Bananas 
from the Philippines, 17 March 2004, available at www.affa.gov.au. 
30 Japan-Apples Panel, n 2, para 8.28. 
31 Japan-Apples AB, n 1, para 136. 
